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I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Bailey v. Cherokee County Appraisal District' raised the question
whether a suit instituted to collect ad valorem taxes that had accrued on
estate property during administration should be considered a cause of
action against the estate, to be brought in probate court, or a claim for
which the heirs were personally liable. The court of appeals ruled that
the heirs could be held personally liable for the taxes and that district
courts had concurrent jurisdiction over such actions with statutory pro-
bate courts.2 The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tax
suit constituted a claim against only the estate and that it should have
been filed in the probate court where the administration was pending.3
The court based its decision on various Probate Code provisions that,
when construed together, appeared to characterize ad valorem taxes as
claims against the estate.4 Consequently, the heirs were not personally
liable for these claims because the estate was still under administration.5
The taxing authorities argued, however, that the district court was em-
powered with original probate jurisdiction and, therefore, had jurisdiction
to hear their tax claims as a matter incident to the estate. The supreme
court disagreed, observing that although a court may be vested with pro-
bate jurisdiction it may exercise its jurisdiction over matters incident to
the estate only if a probate proceeding connected with such matters is
already pending in that court.6 Moreover, the county court at law had
already acquired "dominant" jurisdiction to the exclusion of the district
court, because the estate administration was pending there before the
taxing authorities filed their suit in district court.7 Finally, the court re-
marked that administration of the estate was properly initiated in the
county court at law because such courts share original probate jurisdic-
tion with the constitutional county courts, to the exclusion of the district
courts, in any county where there are statutory courts exercising probate
jurisdiction. 8
This latter ruling in Bailey underpinned the decision in Miller v.
Woods.9 The case arose from a will contest that was initially pending in
the constitutional county court. The county judge subsequently trans-
ferred the case to the county court at law which, in turn, transferred it to
the district court. Based on section 5(c) of the Texas Probate Code' and
the pronouncements of Bailey, the court of appeals determined that the
1. 862 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. 1993).
2. Bailey v. Cherokee County Appraisal Dist., 817 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Tex. App.-
Tyler 1991), rev'd, 862 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. 1993).
3. 862 S.W.2d at 582.
4. Id. at 583 (citing TEX. PROB. CoDE ANN. §§ 322, 329(a)(1) (Vernon 1980 & Supp.
1995)).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 585.
7. Id. at 586; see Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974).
8. Id at 585; see TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(c) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1995).
9. 872 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, no writ).
10. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(c)(Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1995) provides:
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district court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment in the will contest. 1
Because Liberty County had a statutory county court exercising probate
jurisdiction, the court held that such court shared original probate juris-
diction with the constitutional county court, to the exclusion of the dis-
trict court. 12
One other appellate court construed section 5(c) of the Probate Code
during the Survey period. Garland v. Garland'3 holds that although a
family district court is granted continuing jurisdiction over support of a
disabled adult child, this fact does not endow that court with jurisdiction
to grant or deny guardianship of the adult child's estate. 14 Instead, an
application for guardianship of the person or the estate of an adult child
must first be filed in the statutory probate court. 15
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
The Texas Supreme Court emphasized the weight to be given the reci-
tations in the return of service in Primate Construction, Inc. v. Silver.'
6
Defendant Primate Construction appealed by writ of error from a default
judgment entered against it.' 7 Although the plaintiff first added Primate
Construction as a defendant in its second amended petition, the pre-
printed portion of the return of service signed by the sheriff indicated that
the original petition was attached to the citation served on Primate Con-
struction.' 8 The supreme court held that the default judgment had to be
reversed because the record did not affirmatively show proper service,
but instead reflected service of a version of the petition in which Primate
Construction was not named as a defendant. 19 The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the pre-printed portions of the return of service
were entitled to less weight than the information actually filled in by the
officer responsible for effecting service. 20 If the facts recited in any por-
tion of the return are incorrect, it is the obligation of the party requesting
service to ensure that an amended return is filed prior to judgment.21
Rule 108a22 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides a means of
effecting service of process on a party in a foreign country. As one court
In those counties where there is a statutory probate court, county court at
law, or other statutory court exercising the jurisdiction of a probate court, all
applications, petitions and motions regarding probate and administrations
shall be filed and heard in such courts and the constitutional county court,
rather than in the district courts ....
11. Miller, 872 S.W.2d at 345.
12. Id.
13. 868 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ).
14. Id. at 850.
15. Id.; see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 5(c), 606, 609 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1995).
16. 884 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. 1994).
17. Id. at 152.
18. ld
19. Id at 153.
20. Id at 152-53.
21. ld at 153.
22. TEX. R. Qv. P. 108a.
1995] 1617
SMU LAW REVIEW
of appeals recently made clear, however, the rule is not the exclusive
method for serving process on a foreign defendant. 23 The court held that
the Texas long-arm statute,24 which provides for service on "non-resi-
dents," does not distinguish between residents of other states and resi-
dents of foreign countries;25 thus, a party in a foreign country may be
served under the long-ann statute.26
Vandewater v. American General Fire & Casualty Co.27 addressed the
issue of service of process on a minor. The court held that a minor may
not waive service of process upon her by voluntarily appearing in a suit,
nor may the minor's guardian or next friend do so on her behalf. 28 In-
deed, the court concluded that a trial court does not even have jurisdic-
tion to appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor until the minor has been
properly served.29
III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In order to contest the propriety of a Texas court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction, a defendant must file a special appearance under Rule
120a.30 The Texas Supreme Court decided two cases during the Survey
period that define when a defendant may obtain immediate appellate re-
view of a trial court's denial of a special appearance. In the first, Cana-
dian Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig,31 the court held that a defendant normally
has an adequate remedy by way of appeal from the denial of a special
appearance, and mandamus review is therefore unavailable. 32 Noting
that it had not considered this specific issue previously, 33 the court re-
jected the argument that the inconvenience and loss of time that the de-
fendant would suffer in having to go through an entire trial rendered the
appellate remedy inadequate. 34 The court added a curious caveat to its
ruling, however, stating that it would not foreclose the possibility that a
trial court's denial of a special appearance might be so clearly erroneous
that the harm to the defendant would be irreparable and mandamus
would then be appropriate. 35 The dissent seized on this inconsistency in
the majority's opinion, arguing that whether there has been an abuse of
23. Commission of Contracts of the Gen. Executive Comm. of the Petroleum Workers
Union of the Republic of Mexico v. Arriba, Ltd., 882 S.W.2d 576, 584-85 (rex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
24. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.041-.045 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995).
25. See id. § 17.041 (defining "non-resident" to include an individual who is not a resi-
dent of Texas).
26. Arriba, Ltd., 882 S.W.2d at 584-85.
27. No. 3-93-282-CV, 1994 WL 513641 (Tex. App.-Austin, Sept. 21, 1994, n.w.h.).
28. Id. at *3.
29. Id.
30. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a.
31. 876 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. 1994).
32. Id. at 305.
33. Id. at 306.
34. Id. The court also rejected the argument that due process concerns mandate the
availability of immediate appellate court review. Id. at 307-08.
35. Id. at 308-09.
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discretion and whether there is an adequate remedy by appeal are logi-
cally independent inquiries; thus, said the dissent, the issue of the ade-
quacy of an appellate remedy ought not to turn on whether there has
been "a super-clear abuse of discretion. '36
Although Canadian Helicopters represents the general rule in Texas,
the supreme court announced an exception to that rule in K.D.F. v.
Rex.3 7 In Rex, the Kansas Public Employees' Retirement System and two
affiliated entities filed special appearances, contending that the Texas
courts were required by principles of interstate comity to recognize their
sovereign immunity under Kansas law and, therefore, should decline to
exercise jurisdiction over them.38 The supreme court held that appeal
was not an adequate remedy for the denial of a special appearance in this
situation, and that mandamus would therefore lie.39 This "comity excep-
tion" to the general rule, explained the court, is based on "the risk of
harm to interstate and international relations likely to occur if a Texas
trial court erroneously exercises jurisdiction over another sovereign. ' 40
Moore v. Elektro-Mobil Technik GmbH4' and Clark v. Noyes42 ad-
dressed two procedural issues that may arise when a defendant contests
personal jurisdiction. In Moore, the court recognized the general rule
that any act of the defendant invoking the court's judgment on a question
other than jurisdiction may be construed as a general appearance. 43 Nev-
ertheless, the court held that a letter from the insurer of a foreign manu-
facturer sued in Texas, which stated that it was moving to dismiss on
grounds of insufficiency of process and inquired as to whether a local
attorney was necessary to bring the motion, did not waive the manufac-
turer's right later to file a special appearance."4 The court in Clark clari-
fied that, although Texas state courts must utilize the federal due process
standard in analyzing whether an out-of-state defendant has the requisite
minimum contacts with Texas, state procedural rules apply in making that
determination even though they may vary from the procedure followed in
the federal courts.45
The Texas courts continued to explore the outer reaches of the Texas
long-arm statute 46 during the Survey period. The Fort Worth Court of
Appeals' decision in International Turbine Service, Inc. v. Lovitt4 7 is par-
ticularly instructive. The defendant insurers in that case held non-resi-
dent insurance licenses in Texas, although they conducted only a very
36. Id. at 310 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
37. 878 S.W.2d 589 (Tex, 1994).
38. Id at 590-91.
39. Id. at 592-93.
40. Id. at 593.
41. 874 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
42. 871 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ).
43. Moore, 874 S.W.2d at 327.
44. Id. at 326-28.
45. Clark, 871 S.W.2d at 511.
46. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.041-.045 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995).
47. 881 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).
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small portion of their business in Texas.48 Notwithstanding this ongoing
contact with Texas, the court held that the insurers' activities in this state
were not substantial enough to support a finding of general jurisdiction.4 9
Because specific jurisdiction was lacking, therefore, the court affirmed
the trial court's order sustaining the insurers' special appearance.50
IV. VENUE
Although the venue statute expressly mandates reversal on appeal if a
case is transferred to a county of improper venue, the statute is unclear
with respect to cases in which a lawsuit was originally brought in a county
of proper venue, but was subsequently transferred to another county in
which venue was also proper.51 Ten years after the legislature's overhaul
of the Texas venue statute,5 2 the courts of appeals were still split on the
question of whether an erroneous transfer in these circumstances consti-
tuted reversible error.5 3 Some courts concluded by implication from the
statute that a trial court's erroneous venue ruling in these circumstances
was harmless.5 4 Other courts disagreed, holding that a plaintiff's right to
prosecute his suit in the county in which he rightfully brought it is a fun-
damental right that is not susceptible to a harmless error analysis.55 The
supreme court recently ended the controversy by deciding Wilson v.
Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep't.5 6 Wilson holds that a trial court commits
reversible error whenever it transfers a case from a county of proper
venue selected by the plaintiff.5 7
The defendant in Wilson had filed a motion to transfer venue of the
action to Blanco County. The motion was granted and the case was
transferred to Blanco County where, after a jury trial, the court entered a
take-nothing judgment in favor of the defendant. The court of appeals
affirmed, deciding that the erroneous transfer of a lawsuit from one
48. Id. at 809.
49. Id. at 810.
50. Id.
51. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b) (Vernon 1986) ("[I]f venue was
improper it shall in no event be harmless error and shall be reversible error.").
52. See Act of June 17, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 385 § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119,
2119-24 (now codified at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.001-.100 (Vernon
1986)).
53. See discussion in Ernest E. Figari, Jr., A. Erin Dwyer & Donald Colleluori, Texas
Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 47 SMU L. Rev. 1677,1694-96 (1994) [here-
inafter Figari, 1994 Annual Survey].
54. See, e.g., Lewis v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 786 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1989, writ denied); see also Flores v. Arrieta, 790 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1990, writ denied) (dictum) (discussed in Ernest E. Figari, Jr., A. Erin Dwyer & Donald
Colleluori, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 73, 91-92
(1991) [hereinafter Figari, 1991 Annual Survey]).
55. See, e.g., Hendrick v. McMorrow, 852 S.W.2d 22, 24-25 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1993, no writ); Maranatha Temple, Inc. v. Enterprise Prods. Co., 833 S.W.2d 736, 742 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
56. 886 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. 1994).
57. Id. at 261.
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county of proper venue to another did not constitute reversible error.58
The appellate court relied heavily on Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc.5 9 in arriving at
this conclusion. 60 In particular, the court emphasized Ruiz's holding that
a venue decision will be affirmed if venue was proper in "the ultimate
county of suit."6 1 The court of appeals interpreted this statement as
meaning that the propriety of plaintiff's initial venue selection was irrele-
vant once the case had been transferred.62 Although this inference by the
appellate court appeared to be legitimate, it proved to be mistaken.
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals' decision and held
that, if a plaintiff initiates an action in a county of proper venue, transfer
of venue under section 15.063(1)63 would be reversible error even if
venue would have been proper in the county of transfer had it been origi-
nally chosen by the plaintiff.64 According to the court, the plaintiff has
the right to choose venue in the first instance;65 to hold that an erroneous
transfer is harmless would eviscerate that right.66 The court also ob-
served that the language of Rule 8767 is mandatory. 68 Thus, if the plain-
tiff meets its burden under the rule, no other place can be a proper venue
in the case, and the trial court must keep the lawsuit in the county where
it was fflied. 69 The court further noted that its holding would guard
against the forum shopping that occurs when a party intentionally asserts
faulty, invalid grounds for a change of venue from one permissible county
to another permissible county that the party perceives as more
favorable. 70
Wilson also provided the court with an opportunity to reiterate the
standard of appellate review for venue determinations that it announced
58. Wilson v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep't, 853 S.W.2d 825, 829 (Tex. App.-Austin
1993), rev'd, 886 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. 1994).
59. 868 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1993).
60. 853 S.W.2d at 829 (citing Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 36 Tex. S. Ct. J. 412, 418 (Dec. 31,
1992) (opinion withdrawn)). Although the court of appeals decided Wilson before the
supreme court issued its opinion on rehearing in Ruiz, the latter opinion contains language
almost identical to the language from the original opinion in Ruiz that was cited by the
court of appeals. Compare 868 S.W.2d at 758 with 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 417-18.
61. 853 S.W.2d at 829 (citing Ruiz, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 418).
62. I& The court also noted that the Ruiz opinion approvingly cited Lewis v. Exxon
Co., U.S.A., 786 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. App-El Paso 1989, writ denied), thereby indicating an
implicit rejection of the approach taken in Maranatha Temple, Inc. v. Enterprise Prods.
Co., 833 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied). Id. (citing Ruiz,
36 Tex. Sups. Ct. J. at 418).
63. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.063(1) (Vernon 1986) ("The court...
shall transfer an action to another county of proper venue if ... the county in which the
action is pending is not a proper county ... .
64. Wilson, 886 S.W.2d at 261.
65. Id. at 260.
66. Id.
67. TEX R. Civ. P. 87(3)(c) ("If a claimant has adequately pleaded and made prima
facie proof that venue is proper in the county of suit.., then the cause shall not be trans-
ferred but shall be retained in the county of suit .....
68. Wilson, 886 S.W.2d at 261.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 261 n.3 (quoting Maranatha Temple, Inc. v. Enterprise Prods. Co. , 833
S.W.2d 736, 741 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied)).
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last year in Ruiz.71 Under that standard, an appellate court must review
the entire record, including'the trial on the merits, in determining the
propriety of venue.72 This review, said the court, seeks to balance the
conflicting interests of the plaintiff and the defendant. 73 It secures the
plaintiff's right to choose and maintain suit in a county of proper venue,
and it insulates the defendant from the potential effects of fraud or inac-
curacy during the pleading stage. 74
In an interesting case of limited temporal significance, the court in Au-
tin v. Daniel Bruce Marine, Inc.75 held that a Jones Act 76 case pursued in
state court could not be dismissed under either state or federal doctrines
of forum non conveniens.77 The doctrine of forum non conveniens gives
a court discretionary power to decline jurisdiction when the convenience
of the parties and the ends of justice would be better served if another
court heard the action. Four years ago, the supreme court held in Dow
Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro78 that the legislature had statutorily abol-
ished the doctrine in suits brought under section 71.03179 of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code.80 In response to Alfaro, the Texas
Legislature amended the wrongful death statute in 1993 to permit courts
to decline jurisdiction in certain circumstances under the doctrine of fo-
rum non conveniens. 81 This amendment came too late for the hapless
defendant in Autin, however, as the statutorily-enacted doctrine applies
only to cases filed after September 1, 1993.82 Ignoring contrary Fifth Cir-
cuit authority, 83 the court also held that the defendant could not obtain a
dismissal under the federal law of forum non conveniens because the
state, not federal, doctrine applied to a Jones Act case pursued in state
court.8 4 In its strongly-worded opinion, the court also observed that the
policy determinations which establish the rules and principles a Texas
trial court must follow are best left to the Texas Supreme Court and the
Texas Legislature, not the Fifth Circuit.8 5
71. See Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex. 1993).
72. Wilson, 886 S.W.2d at 262.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 862 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ).
76. 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 688 (West 1975 & Supp. 1994).
77. Autin, 862 S.W.2d at 210.
78. 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024 (1991).
79. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1986).
80. 786 S.W.2d at 678-79.
81. Act of March 4, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 4, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 10 (codified at
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995)).
82. Id. at ch. 4, § 2 ("This Act applies to a cause of action filed on or after September
1, 1993."). See also Carl C. Scherz, Comment, Section 71.051 of The Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code - The Texas Legislature's Answer to Alfaro: Forum Non Conveniens in
Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Litigation, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 99, 101-02, 106-09
(1994).
83. See Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307,319-21 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd on
other grounds, 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
84. Autin, 862 S.W.2d at 210.
85. Id. Soon after the Autin decision, the United States Supreme Court decided
American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994), which likewise held that federal
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Although it was less critical of the Fifth Circuit, the Texas Supreme
Court's later opinion in Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo86 fully accorded
with the reasoning of the Autin decision. The court in Chick Kam Choo
also held that the federal maritime law of forum non conveniens did not
preempt the application of Texas "forum non conveniens law" in a non-
Jones Act case.87 The case involved a foreign alien's claim under Singa-
pore law for the death of her husband, which occurred while he was
working in the engine room of a berthed tanker in Singapore. Under
these circumstances, the court perceived "minimal, if any, impact" on in-
ternational maritime commerce from permitting plaintiff's suit to pro-
ceed in a Texas state court. 88 As in Autin, the state doctrine of forum non
conveniens did not apply to this case because it was filed before Septem-
ber 1, 1993.89
If a party contracts in writing to perform an obligation in a particular
county, section 15.035(a) of the venue statute authorizes a suit on that
obligation to be brought in the named county.90 Spiritas Holdings, Inc. v.
Darling-Delaware Co.91 makes clear that this venue exception applies
only when the obligation sued upon is the same obligation for which the
contract specifies a place of performance. The parties in Spiritas had en-
tered into an asset purchase agreement that required the defendant to
make an escrow payment in Tarrant County by a certain date. The par-
ties also agreed that the defendant's failure to pay the escrow amount
would not constitute a breach and, instead, would only authorize the
plaintiff to terminate the agreement. When the defendant subsequently
refused to make the escrow payment, claiming a breach by the plaintiff,
plaintiff filed suit in Tarrant County seeking a declaratory judgment that
it was authorized to terminate the asset purchase agreement. The de-
fendant filed a motion to transfer venue claiming that the only contract
provision containing a place of performance was the escrow clause, but
that because it had no obligation to make the payment that clause could
not be used by the plaintiff as a basis for establishing venue under section
15.035(a). The court of appeals agreed, concluding that plaintiff's suit did
not arise "by reason of" an obligation to pay the earnest money because
the plaintiff had neither sued nor could have sued defendant for its failure
to make this payment.92 Instead, the plaintiff had sued on an "obliga-
tion" growing out of a contract termination provision, and this provision
did not name a county or place of performance. 93 Section 15.035(a) did
law does not preempt state law regarding the doctrine of forum non conveniens in admi-
ralty cases filed under the Jones Act. 114 S. Ct. at 988.
86. 881 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. 1994).
87. Id. at 306.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 303 n.4.
90. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & RIM. CODE ANN. § 15.035(a) (Vernon 1986).
91. 875 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).




not apply, therefore, and the suit was transferred to Dallas County as the
defendant had requested.94
Finally, in Tippy v. Walker95 the supreme court ruled that the six-month
residency period96 for mandatory transfer of venue in child custody modi-
fication motions begins to run when the child's residency in the different
county commences, even if that precedes the date of the original custody
decree. 97 7ppy makes explicit the court's implicit holding over a decade
earlier in Arias v. Spector.98
V. PARTIES
Martinez v. Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc.99 presented the frequently re-
curring question of when a severance order produces a final judgment. It
is well-established that a judgment must dispose of all parties and all is-
sues in order to be a final judgment subject to appeal. 1' ° If a judgment is
final as to some but not all of the parties to an action, the court can make
the judgment final and appealable by severing into a different cause the
claims and parties disposed of by the judgment. 101 If the order of sever-
ance contemplates a subsequent addition of parties to the severed cause,
however, the judgment will not become final until a later order unam-
biguously designates all parties encompassed by the judgment in the sev-
ered cause. 1°2
In Martinez, several defendants had moved for summary judgment on
the basis of limitations while other defendants watched from the side-
lines. The order granting these motions recited that summary judgment
was being rendered in favor of all defendants irrespective of whether they
had filed a summary judgment motion. The court later signed a sever-
ance order with the stated intention of making the summary judgment
final and appealable. That order, however, allowed the previously pas-
sive defendants in the original action to become severed into the new
cause at future dates by filing their own motions for summary judgment.
The supreme court therefore concluded that the order of severance was
interlocutory as to any defendants later added to the action because ap-
pellate deadlines run from the date an order or judgment is signed, 10 3 and
a party cannot become subject to appeal prior to the time that the order
or judgment in fact applies to that party. 1' 4 Indeed, because the order of
94. Id. at 17.
95. 865 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam).
96. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06(b) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995).
97. Tippy, 865 S.W.2d at 929.
98. 623 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1981).
99. 875 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).
100. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966).
101. Martinez, 875 S.W.2d at 312. Depending on the order in which the judge signs
each document, the period for perfecting an appeal may date from either the judgment or
the order of severance. Id at 313.
102. Id. at 314.
103. See Thx. R. App. P. 5(b)(1).
104. Martinez, 875 S.W.2d at 313.
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severance failed to specify all parties disposed of as of the date the order
was signed but, instead, contemplated entry of a later "final" order unam-
biguously specifying all parties included in the severed cause, the court
held that the order and judgment were also interlocutory as to the de-
fendants who had originally moved for summary judgment. 10 5 The ap-
peal was therefore dismissed.
VI. PLEADINGS
Several cases decided during the Survey period focused on the grant or
denial of trial amendments. Rule 66106 requires a trial court to freely
permit trial amendments whenever the objecting party fails to demon-
strate that the amendment would prejudice its prosecution or defense of
the suit. Interpreting this rule several years ago, the supreme court held
that a court may not refuse a trial amendment "unless (1) the opposing
party presents evidence of surprise or prejudice, or (2) the amendment
asserts a new cause of action or defense, and thus is prejudicial on its
face."'1 07 In cases where the rule does not mandate allowance of the trial
amendment, the decision to permit or deny the amendment rests within
the court's discretion.10 8 Misapplication of Rule 66 in a disciplinary pro-
ceeding forced the supreme court to readdress the standards for trial
amendments in State Bar of Texas v. Kilpatrick.10 9 The trial court in the
case had permitted the State Bar to amend its pleadings at trial to include
an allegation of barratry. The court of appeals held that this trial amend-
ment should not have been permitted because it added a new cause of
action and, therefore, was "prejudicial on its face."" 0 The supreme court
interpreted this statement by the court of appeals as effectively holding
that all trial amendments which are not mandatory under Rule 66 must
be rejected."' To the contrary, reiterated the court, the decision whether
to grant or deny a nonmandatory trial amendment is always discretion-
ary. 112 It therefore reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding
that the trial amendment at issue did not entail surprise or unfair preju-
dice of a type that would render its allowance an abuse of discretion."
3
Zavala v. Trujillo'14 furnishes another example of the liberal applica-
tion courts give Rule 66. The trial court there denied the plaintiff's re-
quested trial amendment, which sought to add a new theory of negligence
105. Id at 313-14.
106. TEx. R. Civ. P. 66.
107. Greenhalgh v. Service Lloyd's Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 938, 939 (Tex. 1990)(citations
omitted).
108. Id.
109. 874 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2740 (1994).
110. 869 S.W.2d 361,365 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993), rev'd, 874 S.W.2d 656
(Tex.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2740 (1994).
111. 874 S.W.2d at 658.
112. Id.
113. Id
114. 883 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
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based on an alleged violation of the Texas Water Safety Act.115 The de-
fendant demonstrated that the plaintiff had never revealed this theory of
liability in his discovery responses, and it appears the trial court decided
that this failure to supplement discovery coupled with the plaintiff's fail-
ure to plead the statute caused unfair surprise to the defendant. The
court of appeals disagreed, holding that the plaintiff's lack of diligence
was not a factor to be considered in the Rule 66 equation" 6 and that the
defendant had failed to demonstrate prejudice sufficient to preclude the
allowance of the proposed trial amendment." 7
The decision in Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Ellis,118 on the other
hand, demonstrates that courts are not supposed to grant all trial amend-
ments. Written pleadings to conform to the evidence must at least be
filed before the case is submitted to the jury.119 Although the trial court
in Ellis granted a party's oral motion for leave to file a trial amendment
pleading the existence of "good cause," no amended pleading was filed
prior to submission of the jury charge. The court of appeals held, there-
fore, that the trial court had erred in submitting that issue to the jury. 20
Every trial practitioner knows that a defendant's original answer must
be filed by 10:00 a.m. on the Monday following the expiration of twenty
days after service.12' Conaway v. Lopez 22 makes clear that the answer
need not be rushed to the courthouse by 10:00 a.m. on Thesday if the
defendant's appearance day falls on a legal holiday. Instead, the defend-
ant has until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or
legal holiday to file its answer under these circumstances. 23 The Cona-
way court concluded that Rule 4 plainly applied to the situation, 24 and
that the rule unambiguously extends deadlines to the "end" of the next
day.125 The court also observed that the 10:00 a.m. deadline is simply a
relic that has outlived its usefulness in light of modem practices. 126 In a
somewhat similar vein, the court in Milam v. Miller127 held that a defend-
ant who posted his answer by 10:00 a.m. on his appearance day was not
115. TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. §§ 31.001-.142 (Vernon 1991 & Supp. 1995).
116. Zavala, 883 S.W.2d at 249 (citing Greenhalgh, 787 S.W.2d at 939). Unfortunately,
this rule seems to tolerate, if not invite, "sandbagging." The court hastened to note, how-
ever, that its opinion should not be read to imply approval of plaintiff's discovery disclo-
sures. Zavala, 883 S.W.2d at 249 n.8.
117. Id at 249.
118. 888 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1994, n.w.h.).
119. TEX. R. Civ. P. 67.
120. Ellis, 888 S.W.2d at 831.
121. See TEX. R. CIv. P. 99(c) (requiring that citation contain prescribed notice of when
answer is due).
122. 880 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ requested).
123. Id. at 451. But see Solis v. Garcia, 702 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1985, no writ) (where Monday appearance day was legal holiday, default judgment
rendered at 11:00 a.m. on the following day was proper).
124. Conaway, 880 S.W.2d at 450.
125. Id; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 4.
126. Conaway, 880 S.W.2d at 451.




subject to default even though the answer was not received at the clerk's
office until several days later.128 According to the court, "once the provi-
sions of Rule 5129 are met, the post office becomes a branch of the district
clerk's office for purposes of filing pleadings.' 130 Unfortunately, the
court merely assumed without discussing that the answer would need to
be placed in the mail by 10:00 a.m. on the day in question in order to be
deemed timely. This conclusion is not automatically dictated by the lan-
guage of Rule 5, and it may be open to question in light of the Conaway
rationale.
Cruz v. Morris'3 ' demonstrates that the repercussions of failing to
amend a pleading in response to a court's order sustaining special excep-
tions can be quite severe. Although it is well established that a court may
not strike a pleading on special exceptions without first providing the af-
fected party an opportunity to amend, 132 the trial court in Cruz struck a
party's damage allegations and, ultimately, her entire pleading after she
failed to cure a defect in her allegations that was raised by special excep-
tion. Observing that this action may have been a bit too severe, the court
of appeals nevertheless affirmed the trial court's action as being within
the bounds of its discretion. 133
VII. DISCOVERY
A. DISCOVERY PROCEDURES
Trial practitioners representing corporate clients should take note of
Justice Gonzalez's dissent from the supreme court's denial of leave to file
a petition for writ of mandamus in Monsanto Co. v. May.'34 The issue
raised in Monsanto - which Justice Gonzalez noted had been before the
court three times previously, bui which it had been prevented from re-
viewing each time - was the propriety of so-called "apex" deposi-
tions.135 Justice Gonzalez described an apex deposition as one in which a
plaintiff seeks to depose the highest ranking executive officials of a large
corporation, who have no personal knowledge of the facts at issue, as a
strategy for forcing settlement. 136 Justice Gonzalezwould hold that such
a deposition should be allowed only if (1) it is reasonable to conclude that
the executive has personal knowledge of the underlying facts, and (2) less
intrusive means of discovery have been exhausted. 137
128. Id at *2.
129. TEx. R. Civ. P. 5 provides that any document sent to the proper clerk by first-class
U.S. mail in a properly addressed and stamped wrapper, and deposited in the mail on or
before the last day for filing same, is deemed timely filed so long as it is received by the
clerk no more than ten days tardily.
130. Milam, 1994 WL 319588 at *1.
131. 877 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
132. See Texas Dep't of Corrections v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Tex. 1974).
133. Cruz, 877 S.W.2d at 48.
134. 889 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1994) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
135. Id at 274.
136. Id
137. It at 277.
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The plaintiff in Overall v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc.' 38
served a combined set of interrogatories and requests for production of
documents that required responses within thirty days.'39 The court of ap-
peals concluded that while this timing was consistent with Rule 167,140
which requires a response to a request for production within thirty days
of service of the request,'14 it ran afoul of the rule governing interrogato-
ries, which provides that the time allowed for responding shall not be less
than thirty days.' 42 According to the court, this defect in the interrogato-
ries did not infect the accompanying requests for production and, there-
fore, the defendant was still required to produce responsive documents
within the thirty-day time frame.143 Because the defendant did not send
the plaintiff certain responsive documents in its possession, but instead
argued they were available for inspection at its attorney's office, the court
upheld the trial court's refusal to allow the defendant to introduce those
documents at trial.1'"
The court's analysis in Overall is suspect on several fronts. First, Rule
168(4) 145 envisions that the party propounding interrogatories shall spec-
ify a time within which the answering party must respond, and that the
time so specified shall not be less than thirty days.146 The Overall plaintiff
specified thirty days exactly. The court's conclusion that this was im-
proper seems to assume that, by asking for answers within thirty days, the
plaintiff was requiring answers to be served not more than twenty-nine
days after service of the interrogatories. The defendant could have
served his answers to the interrogatories on the thirtieth day, however,
thereby complying with both Rule 168(4) 147 and the time specified by the
plaintiff.148
Similarly, the court's conclusion that Rule 167(1)(f)149 requires a party
to send documents along with its response to the party who has served
the request for production is questionable. The provision cited by the
court appears to address only the manner of organization of documents
made available for inspection - not the timing or location of their pro-
duction.' 50 These latter issues are dealt with in other sections of the rule,
which provide that (1) a party shall produce responsive documents to
which no objection has been made after serving its response, 151 and (2)
138. 869 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
139. Id. at 630.
140. TEx. R. Civ. P. 167.
141. TEx. R. Ctv. P. 167(2).
142. TEx. R. Cv. P. 168(4); Overall, 869 S.W.2d at 630-31.
143. Overall, 869 S.W.2d at 631.
144. Id
145. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(4).
146. Id
147. TEX. R. CIv. P. 168(4).
148. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 4 (in computing time periods under the rules of procedure the
last day of the period is included).
149. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(1)(f).
150. Id.
151. TEx. R. Civ. P. 167(1)(d).
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the requesting party shall specify a reasonable time, place, and manner
for inspecting the documents.' 5 2
Rule 167a' 53 authorizes the trial court to order a mental examination
of a party who has put his mental condition in issue.1' The supreme
court has held that routine allegations of mental anguish do not place a
party's mental condition in issue for purposes of this rule.155 In Crouch v.
Gleason, 56 however, the court held that an allegation that the defendant
exploited the plaintiff's mental weaknesses was sufficient to put the plain-
tiff's mental condition in issue and to permit the court to order a mental
examination. 157
Davis v. Ruffino 158 addressed the proper locale of the defendant's dep-
osition during the pendency of a motion to transfer venue. The defend-
ant complained that, until his venue motion was heard, any deposition of
him should be taken where he resided rather than in the county of suit.
159
The court of appeals disagreed and held that the trial court had the dis-
cretion to order the deposition to be taken in the county of suit.' 6°
B. PRIVILEGES AND EXEMPTIONS
The Texas Supreme Court upheld First Amendment' 6 ' claims of privi-
lege in two cases decided during the Survey period. In the first, Tilton v.
Moy6, 162 the court was faced with a claim by evangelist Robert Tilton that
the First Amendment's freedom of association guarantee 63 protected
him from having to disclose a list of those he claimed to have healed. 164
The trial court had rejected this claim of privilege in a suit brought
against Tilton by one of his former followers. 165 The supreme court con-
ditionally granted mandamus relief, vacating the trial court's order.
66
The court held that, like a request for a membership list, the request at
issue was specifically aimed at identifying persons who share particular
(in this case, religious) beliefs. 167 In the absence of a more particularized
showing of need, therefore, the court concluded that the requested dis-
covery was improper.168
152. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(1)(c).
153. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167a.
154. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167a(a).
155. Coates v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Tex. 1988).
156. 875 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, orig. proceeding).
157. Id. at 739-40.
158. 881 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding).
159. Id. at 187.
160. Id
161. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
162. 869 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. 1994).
163. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
164. Tilton, 869 S.W.2d at 956.
165. Id.
166. Id at 958.




Similarly, the court held in Ex Parte Lowe' 69 that the Attorney General
had not made a sufficient showing of need to justify production of the
membership list of the Texas Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in the face of a
First Amendment privilege claim.170 The court interpreted United States
Supreme Court precedent as requiring the state to make a convincing
showing of a substantial relationship between the information sought and
a compelling state interest.' 7' Proof of the Texas Knights' discriminatory
beliefs was insufficient to meet this test. 72
In Simpson v. Tennant,173 a case of first impression in Texas, 174 the
court held that under the communications-to-clergymen privilege the
identity of a communicant, as well as the substance of the communica-
tion, was privileged from disclosure pursuant to Rule 505 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Evidence. 175 The clergyman in Simpson refused to disclose
in his deposition what he had been told about the cause of a playground
accident, or from whom he had received the information, because the
information had come to him in the context of a confession. The court
had little difficulty in concluding that the substance of the communication
was privileged. 176 The identity of the communicant presented a more dif-
ficult issue, however, because Rule 505 speaks only of privileged commu-
nications, 177 and the rules of procedure expressly authorize discovery of
potential parties and persons with knowledge of relevant facts.178 Never-
theless, relying on a variety of policy rationales, the court held that the
identity of the communicant was also privileged.179 The court bolstered
its conclusion by analogy to the attorney-client privilege, noting that the
identity of a client can be privileged where it is "inextricably intertwined
with the subject matter of the communication.' 80 Based on the clergy-
man's description, the court reasoned it was a fair inference that the un-
identified communicant was involved in the events leading up to the
playground accident.18'
The Texas Supreme Court extended the reasoning of National Union
Fire Insurance Co. v. Valdez,' 82 which held that a request for an attor-
169. 887 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1994).
170. Id. at 3. The court first rejected a "per se 'Ku Klux Klan' exception" to the quali-
fied First Amendment associational rights privilege. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 4.
173. 871 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding).
174. Id. at 303. Indeed, the court was unable to locate more than a few authorities from
any jurisdiction addressing this issue. Id. at 311-12.
175. TEX. R. Civ. EviD. 505; Simpson, 871 S.W.2d at 306.
176. Id. at 305-06.
177. TEX. R. Civ. EviD. 505(b).
178. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(d).
179. Simpson, 871 S.W.2d at 309.
180. Id.
181. Id. The court did not address whether a party could be required to supply the
identity of a potential witness in the less revealing context of an interrogatory answer if his
only knowledge of the witness was derived from a communication privileged under TEx.
R. Civ. EVID. 505.
182. 863 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. 1993).
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ney's entire litigation file is objectionable on work product grounds, 183 to
a request for a district attorney's file in a criminal case.' 8 4 The court con-
cluded that, even though the trial court's order had allowed the district
attorney to remove particular documents from the file that were pro-
tected by the attorney-client or work product privileges, the organization
of the non-privileged portions of the file could provide clues as to the
prosecutor's mental impressions, and the work product objection was
therefore valid.' 8 5
The supreme court has ruled that the "offensive use" waiver doctrine,
which prohibits a party from asserting an affirmative claim for relief and
at the same time refusing to disclose highly relevant information based on
a claim of privilege, can be applied to the attorney-client privilege. 186 In
Valero Energy Corp. v. M.W. Kellogg Construction Co.' 87 the court cited
the plaintiff's offensive use of the attorney-client privilege not to support
a finding that privilege had been waived, but as a basis to strike certain
allegations in the plaintiff's pleadings. 188 Denton v. Texas Department of
Public Safety Officers Association'89 addressed the related question of
what a trial court should do when a plaintiff who is the subject of a pend-
ing criminal prosecution invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege190
against giving testimony in his civil suit. In order to avoid putting the
plaintiff to the choice of waiving his privilege or foregoing his civil claim,
the court of appeals concluded that the trial court should have granted an
abatement of the civil suit until the criminal case was over. 191
Rule 510192 of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence establishes a privilege
for mental health information. The rule contains an exception, however,
for communications or records relevant to the mental condition of a pa-
tient in a suit in which any party relies upon such condition as a part of its
claim or defense. 193 Despite the seemingly clear language of this excep-
tion, intermediate appellate courts were split with respect to the question
of whether the exception should be held to apply only when a party at-
tempted to use the privilege offensively.' 94 In R.K. V. Ramirez, 95 the
supreme court resolved the issue by holding that the patient-litigant ex-
ception stated in Rule 510(d)(5) is unrelated to the offensive use doctrine
183. Id. at 460.
184. State ex rel. Curry v. Walker, 873 S.W.2d 379, 380-81 (Tex. 1994).
185. Id. Because the defendants in the criminal cases were on probation or had re-
ceived deferred adjudication, the court treated those cases as still active, thereby avoiding
the question of whether the work product protection would extend beyond the conclusion
of the criminal prosecutions. Id at 380 n.1.
186. Republic Ins. Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex. 1993).
187. 866 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
188. Id. at 256.
189. 862 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ granted).
190. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
191. Denton, 862 S.W.2d at 792.
192. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 510.
193. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 510(d)(5).
194. See R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836, 841 (Tex. 1994).
195. 887 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1994).
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and exists independently from it.196 The patient-litigant exception there-
fore applies whenever "a party's condition relates in a significant way to a
party's claim or defense."'197
C. SANCTIONS
The Texas courts continued to struggle during the Survey period with
the standard for the imposition of "death penalty" sanctions (e.g., striking
pleadings, default judgments) announced by the supreme court in Trans-
American Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell.198 For example, State v. Car-
rillo'99 stands for the proposition that the TransAmerican guidelines do
not apply to the sanction of deemed admissions based on a party's eva-
sive or incomplete answers.2°° The court reasoned that Rule 215(4) of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 201 does not provide for any less severe
sanction for the failure to properly respond to a request for admission, 20
2
and a trial court therefore cannot consider the possibility of imposing less
severe sanctions as TransAmerican requires. 20 3 Moreover, the deeming
of certain matters as admitted is not necessarily dispositive of a party's
claims or defenses.2°4
The uncertainty about how strictly a court will enforce the TransAmeri-
can standards is typified by two decisions rendered within a month of
each other by the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals. In the first, Allied
Resources Corp. v. Mo-Vac Service Co., Inc.,205 the trial court ordered the
defendants to produce certain documents and to pay a monetary sanc-
tion; if the sanction was not paid, the court's order warned, a default
judgment would be entered.2°6 The documents were not timely pro-
duced, the monetary sanction was not paid, and the trial court entered
the default judgment.207 The court of appeals upheld this sanction as ap-
propriate and just, notwithstanding that the defendants had responded to
other discovery, had their attorney withdraw during the course of the dis-
covery dispute, and had not received any notice of the hearing at which
the court actually entered the default judgment.208 In contrast, the same
court held in Zappe v. Zappe209 that the trial court abused its discretion
196. Id. at 841.
197. ld at 842.
198. 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991).
199. 885 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, n.w.h.).
200. I& at 216.
201. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(4).
202. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 215(4)(a).
203. Carrillo, 885 S.W.2d at 216.
204. Id.
205. 871 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied).
206. Id. at 778.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 780-81. The court described the defendants' conduct of the entire case as
"marked by delay, avoidance and obstruction of process," i at 780, a characterization
with some support in the factual recitation. Nevertheless, the discovery abuse on which the
sanction was based was limited just to the defendants' failure to produce certain docu-
ments over a period of several months.
209. 871 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
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in striking a party's pleadings for failing to timely and completely respond
to discovery.210 As in Allied Resources, the ultimate sanction was im-
posed in Zappe only after the offending party failed to pay attorney's fees
the court had awarded.211 Because the party raised the issue of her in-
ability to pay the monetary sanction, however, and the trial court made
no further inquiry on that subject, the appellate court held that the sanc-
tion could not stand.212
D. DUTY TO SUPPLEMENT
Rule 166b(6)(b) 213 requires parties to supplement their discovery re-
sponses to disclose the identity of expert witnesses they expect to call to
testify "as soon as is practical," but in no event less than thirty days prior
to trial.214 The Texas Supreme Court resolved a conflict among the
courts of appeals regarding the significance of this "as soon as is practi-
cal" requirement in Mentis v. Barnard.215 The court stated that this pro-
vision does not establish any particular time in the life of a lawsuit when
experts must be designated, nor does it require a party to identify a po-
tential expert as soon as he is first contacted. 216 The rule requires only
designation as soon as practical after it is decided that the expert is ex-
pected to be called at trial.217 Thus, if a party seeks to exclude her oppo-
nent's expert witness based on this provision, she cannot merely point to
how long the case was on file before the expert was designated, but must
instead adduce evidence that the designation was improperly delayed. 218
As in prior years, the automatic exclusion of witnesses who are not
disclosed at least thirty days before trial was the subject of a number of
cases during the Survey period. In Aluminum Co. of America v. Bul-
lock,219 the supreme court held that the defendant demonstrated good
cause for failing to designate an expert witness where the expert's testi-
mony was necessary to rebut previously undisclosed changes in the testi-
mony of plaintiffs' expert. 220 The court also noted that the plaintiffs
themselves had identified the expert they objected to the defendant call-
ing, but specifically refused to decide whether this fact alone would have
been sufficient to support a finding of good cause to allow the defendant
to call the expert as a witness.221 In Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A. v.
Thompson,222 the supreme court did not even reach the issue of good
210. 1& at 914.
211. 1d at 912.
212. Id. at 913-14 (citing Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex. 1991)).
213. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b(6)(b).
214. Id
215. 870 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. 1994).
216. Id at 16.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. 870 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. 1994).
220. Id at 4.
221. Id
222. 872 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. 1994).
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cause in light of its determination that the parties' agreement limiting
discovery effectively withdrew plaintiffs' interrogatory regarding expert
witnesses and, therefore, left nothing to be supplemented.223
The intermediate appellate courts also grappled with the interplay be-
tween the automatic exclusion rule and the limitations on "death pen-
alty" sanctions described in TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v.
Powell.224 In Smart v. Winslow,225 the court concluded that the trial
court's "mechanistic application" 226 of Rule 215(5)227 to exclude all of
the plaintiff's expert testimony, with the result that a directed verdict was
entered against him, violated the standards of TransAmerican and due
process. 228 The court in Crane v. Texas Department of Transportation229
took a different tack, holding that while the exclusion of the plaintiff's
experts was mandated by Rule 215(5),230 the trial court abused its discre-
tion, as limited by TransAmerican, in refusing to continue the trial in or-
der to allow the plaintiff time to supplement her discovery responses. 231
The El Paso Court of Appeals concluded that a party's failure to sign
and verify his supplemental interrogatory answers justified the trial
court's exclusion of the testimony of an expert witness identified in such
supplemental answers. 232 The court acknowledged the line of cases hold-
ing that supplemental answers need not be verified.233 It reasoned, how-
ever, that all but one of those cases involved only the failure to verify
supplemental answers, while in the case before it the party had not com-
plied with any of the formalities required by Rule 168(5).234
Any complaint on appeal regarding a trial court's decision to allow or
exclude an expert witness' testimony is subject to a harmless error stan-
223. d at 224.
224. 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991). The supreme court did not reach this issue in a case in
which the argument was made to it that the automatic exclusion sanction violated Trans-
American. Thomas v. Ray, 889 S.W.2d 237, 239 n.2 (Tex. 1994).
225. 868 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ).
226. Id. at 414.
227. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(5).
228. Smart, 868 S.W.2d at 416. See also Linkous v. Murry, 875 S.W.2d 41, 42-43 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) (holding that the exclusion of all expert testi-
mony as a sanction for failure to answer an unrelated interrogatory constituted a death
penalty sanction, which was too severe under the circumstances).
229. 880 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. App.-Tller 1994, writ denied).
230. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(5).
231. Crane, 880 S.W.2d at 57-59. See also Texas Tech Univ. Health Sciences Ctr. v.
Apodaca, 876 S.W.2d 402, 409-10 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied) (party objecting
to undesignated expert's testimony was not prejudiced by postponement of trial that al-
lowed other party time to supplement).
232. Ramirez v. Ramirez, 873 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex. App.-Ei Paso 1994, no writ).
233. Id. (citing cases). See also Stern v. State ex reL Ansel, 869 S.W.2d 614, 628 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (lack of verification of supplemental an-
swers did not require exclusion of witness).
234. TEx. R. Civ. P. 168(5); Ramirez, 873 S.W.2d at 740. The only other "formality"
mentioned by the court was the party's failure to sign the supplemental answers. Of
course, in the cases cited by the court where supplemental answers were not verified, they
likely were not signed by the party either; thus, the court's attempt to distinguish those
cases does not seem meaningful.
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dard.235 Error in excluding the witness requires reversal only if the wit-
ness' testimony would have been controlling on a material issue and not
cumulative. 236 In Williams Distrib. Co. v. Franklin,2 37 the court construed
this standard to mean that the exclusion of a party's expert witness was
harmless where that party had identified other potential experts on the
same subject in its interrogatory answers, but did not attempt to call them
at trial.238
E. MISCELLANEOUS
The supreme court narrowed the scope of mandamus review of discov-
ery disputes two years ago in Walker v. Packer.239 Indeed, the dissent in
Walker predicted that mandamus would virtually never be available to
review a trial court's order denying requested discovery.240 If Gustafson
v. Chambers241 is any indication, the dissent's concern was greatly over-
stated. First, the Gustafson court held that when a trial court improperly
sustains an objection to a written interrogatory, and the interrogatory
therefore is not answered, there is no adequate remedy on appeal be-
cause the requested information is not made a part of the record. 242 Sec-
ond, the court interpreted Walker as permitting mandamus to correct an
erroneous denial of discovery that goes "to the heart of a party's case. '243
This standard is arguably more liberal than that envisioned by the major-
ity in Walker, which spoke of the inadequacy of an appellate remedy
where the denial of discovery so severely hampers a party's ability to
present its case that to conduct the trial "would be a waste of judicial
resources. "244
In Kessell v. Bridewell,245 the court held that a non-party has standing,
both in the trial court and in the court of appeals, to object to a party's
production of documents in which the non-party has a privacy interest.2 46
The objectors in that case were employees of the defendant insurance
company, whose performance evaluation records were sought by the
plaintiffs. 247 Finding no controlling case law, the court of appeals deter-
mined that the discovery rules must be construed broadly enough to al-
low non-parties to object in these circumstances. 24 8 It would be
incongruous, the court reasoned, to let the defendant employer assert ob-
jections on the employees' behalf while depriving the employees them-
235. Mentis v. Barnard, 870 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. 1994).
236. Id.
237. 884 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ requested).
238. Id. at 509-10.
239. 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992).
240. Id. at 846 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
241. 871 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding).
242. Id at 945 (citing Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843).
243. Gustafson, 871 S.W.2d at 947 (citing Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843).
244. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843.
245. 872 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. App.-Waco 1994, orig. proceeding).
246. Id. at 840.
247. Id. at 839.
248. Id. at 839-40.
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selves of the right to assert a constitutional privacy claim that is personal
to them.249
The procedure governing special masters was the subject of Trans-
American Natural Gas Corp. v. Mancias.250 Although the court approved
the use of a special master to provide the trial judge with required techni-
cal expertise, it held that it was clearly improper to order, as the trial
court did, that the master could be deposed and could testify at trial re-
garding his findings.251 Allowing such testimony would cast the master in
the role of advocate rather than impartial referee.252 In addition, the ap-
pellate court held that the trial court lacked the authority to order the
parties to pre-pay the anticipated fees for the special master.253
VIII. DISMISSAL
Osterloh v. Ohio Decorative Products, Inc.254 involved the propriety of
a trial court's reliance on the address listed for plaintiff's attorney in a
register of attorneys maintained by the district clerk, rather than the ad-
dress reflected in the court's own file. A notice of intent to dismiss for
want of prosecution was sent to plaintiff's counsel at an old address
found in the Harris County District Clerk's Register of Attorneys. 255 The
court's file accurately reflected plaintiff's counsel's new address; how-
ever, he had failed to update the district clerk's register.256 The court of
appeals held that the district clerk had no authority to ignore the address
shown in the papers on file in sending the notice of intent to dismiss.
257
Accordingly, the plaintiff was entitled to challenge the dismissal by bill of
review, since his counsel had not received proper notice, and the failure
to update the district clerk's register was not a sufficient basis to conclude
that he was negligent as a matter of law.258
Pursuant to Rule 165a(3), 25 9 an oral hearing must be held on a timely-
filed motion to reinstate a case that has been dismissed for want of prose-
cution.260 In Matheson v. American Carbonics,261 the court construed
this rule to mean that the movant need not even request a hearing; it is
incumbent upon the trial court to conduct the hearing regardless. 262 The
249. Id. at 840.
250. 877 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, orig. proceeding).
251. Id at 843.
252. Id
253. Id at 844.
254. 881 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
255. Id at 581.
256. Id
257. Id at 582.
258. Id at 581-82 (bill of review complainant must prove, inter alia, that he was pre-
vented from asserting claim or defense by fraud, accident, or mistake of the opposing party
or court personnel, unmixed with any fault or negligence of his own).
259. TEx. R. Civ. P. 165a(3).
260. Id
261. 867 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, no writ).
262. Id at 147-48 (disagreeing with Cabrera v. Cedarapids, Inc., 834 S.W.2d 615, 618
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
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court noted, however, that the movant may affirmatively waive a hearing
on its motion to reinstate.263
IX. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Several significant decisions involving summary judgment procedure
emanated from the Texas Supreme Court during the Survey period. In
Lewis v. Blake264, for example, the court addressed two questions of pro-
cedure. First, when a motion for summary judgment is served by mail,
does Rule 21a 265 add three days to the twenty-one day notice of hearing
period prescribed by Rule 166a? 266 Second, does Rule 4267 govern the
computation of this notice period prescribed by Rule 166a? 268 Answer-
ing both questions in the affirmative, the court held that Rule 21a extends
the minimum notice period for a summary judgment hearing by three
days when the motion is served by mail.269 Applying Rule 4, the court
also concluded that the day of hearing, but not the day of service, is to be
included in computing the minimum twenty-one day notice period under
Rule 166a(c). 270 As a result, the court rejected appellant's argument that
a summary judgment hearing could not be held before the twenty-fifth
day after the date a motion for summary judgment was mailed.271 In-
stead, Rule 4 allows a summary judgment motion to be heard on the
twenty-fourth day after it is served by mail.272
In Mafrige v. Ross 273 the supreme court attempted to eliminate confu-
sion caused by two of its earlier decisions 274 about the finality of orders
granting motions for summary judgment. Twelve years ago, when the
court held that a summary judgment order was final in Schlipf v. Exxon
263. Matheson, 867 S.W.2d at 147 n.2. See also Solomon v. Parkside Med. Serv., Inc.,
882 S.W.2d 492,492-93 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.) (party who requests
that motion to reinstate be set on the submission docket without an oral hearing is es-
topped from complaining that the court failed to conduct such a hearing).
264. 876 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1994).
265. TEx. R. Civ. P. 21a provides, in pertinent part: "Whenever a party has the right or
is required to do some act within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other
paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail or by telephonic
document transfer, three days shall be added to the prescribed period."
266. Lewis, 876 S.W.2d at 314; TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
267. TEX. R. Civ. P. 4 states in part: "In computing any period of time prescribed or
allowed by these rules ... the day of the act, event, or default after which the designated
period of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed
is to be included .... "
268. Lewis, 876 S.W.2d at 314.
269. Lewis, 876 S.W.2d at 315. In so holding, the court expressly disapproved of three
court of appeals' decisions that have reached the contrary conclusion. See Cronen v. City
of Pasadena, 835 S.W.2d 206, 208-09 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); De
Los Santos v. Southwest Tex. Methodist Hosp., 802 S.W.2d 749, 754 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1990, no writ); Lynch v. Bank of Dallas, 746 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1988, writ denied).
270. Lewis, 876 S.W.2d at 316.
271. Id at 315.
272. Id at 315.
273. 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1993).
274. See Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. 1984); Schlipf v. Exxon Corp., 644
S.W.2d 453 (Tex. 1982).
SMU LAW REVIEW
Corp., it noted that the judgment included "Mother Hubbard" language
and emphasized that such language helped clarify that a trial court in-
tended its judgment to be final.275 TWo years later, however, the court
stated in Teer v. Duddlesten that Mother Hubbard clauses should not be
used in partial summary judgments. 276 Opining that Schlipf represents
the better view, the court in Mafrige held that if a summary judgment
order appears to be final, it should be treated as such for purposes of
appeal.277 The court observed that litigants should be able to rely on
judgments that facially appear to be final, and that higher courts should
be able to treat such judgments as final when considering appeals. 278
Several decisions 279 over the past few years have held that the Deer-
field280 authentication rules for unfiled discovery materials survived the
1990 amendments to Rule 166a.281 Disagreeing with these earlier cases,
the supreme court held in McConathy v. McConathy282 that authentica-
tion of deposition excerpts submitted as summary judgment evidence is
no longer required under Rule 166a(d). 283 According to the court, para-
graph d of Rule 166a, which was added by the 1990 amendments, super-
seded any authentication requirements such as those articulated in
Deerfield.284 The court observed that depositions are available to all par-
ties in a case, and that the accuracy of excerpts submitted with motions
for summary judgment can be easily verified.285 Thus, said the court, au-
thentication is neither necessary nor required under the amended rule.286
X. JURY PRACTICE
Further expanding the limitations on the use of peremptory jury strikes
it first imposed in Batson v. Kentucky,287 the United States Supreme
Court held in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.288 that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits discrimination in the exercise of peremptory strikes on
275. Schlipf, 644 S.W.2d at 454.
276. Teer, 664 S.W.2d at 704.
277. Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 592. Evidence of a court's intention that its judgment be
final includes language that purports to dispose of all claims or parties. Id.
278. Id.
279. See, e.g., Prowse v. Schelhase, 838 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no
writ); Hollingsworth v. King, 810 S.W.2d 772, 773-74 (Tex. App.-Amarillo), writ denied
per curiam, 816 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1991), discussed in Figari, 1991 Annual Survey, supra note
54, at 91-92.
280. See Deerfield Land Joint Venture v. Southern Union Realty Co., 758 S.W.2d 608,
610 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
281. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 166a(d), added by a Supreme Court of Texas order of April 24,
1990, effective September 1, 1990.
282. 869 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1994).
283. Id. at 341.
284. Id. at 342.
285. Id
286. Id.
287. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Batson, the Court held that the government could not, in a
criminal case, use its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. Id. at 89. The
Court extended Batson to civil suits in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,
615 (1991).
288. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
1638 [Vol. 48
1995] CIVIL PROCEDURE 1639
the basis of gender. 289 Citing the long history of gender discrimination in
the United States, the Court concluded that, in the exercise of peremp-
tory strikes, group generalizations based on sex were no less invidious
than those based on race.29° Although J.E.B. involved a state's use of
peremptory strikes in a civil proceeding, it seems certain that the majority
opinion was intended to restrain even a private litigant's conduct in civil
cases.
291
Civil trial practitioners who are unfamiliar with the procedural steps
involved in making or defending a Batson challenge should review Texas
Tech University Health Sciences Center v. Apodaca.292 Relying on case
law developed in the criminal context, the court in Apodaca first de-
scribed the prima facie case of discrimination the movant must present in
order to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing challenging the opposing
party's use of her peremptory strikes.293 At such a hearing, the chal-
lenged party has the burden of articulating a non-discriminatory reason
for striking the veniremember, and, once she has done so, the burden of
persuasion shifts back to the movant to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the proffered justification is pretextual.294 The appellate
court will review the trial court's determination under a clearly erroneous
standard based on the record in its entirety.295
Rule 220296 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
failure of a party to appear at trial constitutes a waiver of his right to a
jury trial.2 9 7 The Texas Supreme Court resolved a conflict among the
courts of appeals regarding the scope of this waiver in Bradley Motors v.
Mackey.298 The Amarillo Court of Appeals had held in Mackey that the
defendant's failure to appear at trial waived his right to a jury trial only
289. Id. at 1421.
290. IM at 1422-28. Interestingly, the Court noted that the use of strikes based on other
characteristics that may be disproportionately associated with one sex or the other might
still be permissible, provided the proffered reason is not pretextual. Id at 1424.
291. Id. at 1427-29 (discussing the right of individual jurors, as well as parties, to non-
discriminatory jury selection procedures and concluding that "litigants may not strike po-
tential jurors solely on the basis of gender") (emphasis added). See also id. at 1430-31(O'Connor, J., concurring) (expressing belief that the Court's holding should be limited to
government's use of peremptory strikes).
292. 876 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
293. Id. at 407-08.
294. Id. at 408.
295. Id. In re A.D.E., 880 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ), in-
volved an unsuccessful Batson challenge. The state in that case responded to an allegation
of racial discrimination with the assertion that one African-American veniremember was
struck because she was a neighbor of plaintiff's attorney, and the other was struck because
she was a "grandmotherly type." Id. at 243-45. Interestingly, although A.D.E. was decided
after the United States Supreme Court's decision in J.E.B. outlawing gender discrimination
in the use of peremptory strikes, the court did not mention that decision. The careful
practitioner should now question, however, whether reasons offered for strikes that are
racially neutral, such as the "grandmotherly type" reason articulated in A.D.E., might be
interpreted as evidencing a gender bias.
296. TEX. R. Civ. P. 220.
297. Id.
298. 878 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. 1994).
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with respect to liability and not unliquidated damages.299 Pointing out
that no other court of appeals had ever reached that conclusion, the
supreme court reversed.3oo The court held that Rule 220301 controlled
over the arguably inconsistent Rule 243,302 which provides that if a de-
fault judgment is rendered on a claim for unliquidated damages, and the
defendant has demanded a jury, the court should not hear evidence of
damages, but should instead award a writ of inquiry and set the case on
the jury docket. 30 3
Two other noteworthy cases during the Survey period addressed a
party's effort to properly perfect its right to a jury trial. In Almaguer v.
Jenkins,3° 4 the court held that where a jury is timely requested, but the
jury fee is paid late, a party is entitled to a jury trial unless the adverse
party would be prejudiced or the court's docket disrupted.30 5 In Sunwest
Reliance Acquisitions Group, Inc. v. Provident National Assurance Co.,36
on the other hand, the court held that even a properly perfected right to a
jury trial can be waived if the trial judge proceeds to trial without a jury,
and the requesting party fails to object or otherwise affirmatively indicate
on the record that it intends to stand on its right to a jury trial.307
XI. JURY QUESTIONS
In its original opinion in Spencer v. Eagle Star Insurance Co. of
America,308 the Texas Supreme Court held that where a submitted jury
question was merely defective because it failed to include a necessary
accompanying instruction, rather than immaterial, the objecting party is
entitled only to a new trial and not a judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict.30 9 During the Survey period, the court substituted a new opinion on
rehearing in Spencer, although it adhered to its original conclusion.310
The court distinguished the cases relied upon by the defendant and amici
curiae in their motions for rehearing for the proposition that rendition of
judgment was appropriate, noting that those cases involved the failure to
submit any jury question at all on a controlling issue.311 The court was
similarly unpersuaded by the argument that future plaintiffs would be
given an incentive to submit defective jury charges in hopes of a
favorable verdict, knowing that their only risk on appeal is the possibility
299. Mackey v. Bradley Motors, Inc., 871 S.W.d 243, 248-49 (Tex. App.-Amarillo),
aff'd in part and rev'd and remanded in part, 878 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. 1994).
300. Mackey, 878 S.W.2d at 141.
301. TEX. R. Civ. P. 220.
302. TEX. R. Civ. P. 243.
303. Id.; Mackey, 878 S.W.2d at 141.
304. 882 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
305. Id at 904-05.
306. 875 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ).
307. Id. at 387.
308. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1090 (June 30, 1993), withdrawn and substituted by, 876 S.W.2d
154 (Tex. 1994).
309. Id. at 1092.
310. Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. of Am., 876 S.W.2d 154, 155-58 (Tex. 1994).
311. Id. at 157-58.
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that a new trial will be ordered. 312 According to the court, the need to
retry a case should be sufficient disincentive to requesting an erroneous
charge; moreover, it is ultimately the trial court's responsibility to ensure
that a proper charge is submitted.313
The supreme court also clarified the respective burdens on the parties
in submitting jury questions and accompanying instructions in Dresser In-
dustries, Inc. v. Lee.314 The plaintiff objected to the defendant's proposed
contributory negligence question as not being "in substantially correct
wording" because it was not accompanied by an instruction that the
plaintiff had no duty to discover defects in a product or to guard against
their existence. 315 Although the court assumed the accuracy of the plain-
tiff's statement of the substantive law, it nevertheless rejected his com-
plaint regarding the proposed submission.316 The court held instead that
the burden was on the plaintiff to object to the absence of a limiting
instruction. 317
Alaniz v. Jones & Neuse, Inc.,318 serves as a reminder that the submis-
sion of a proposed charge prior to trial may not be sufficient to preserve
error.319 The court in Alaniz concluded that the plain language of Rule
273320 requires a party to submit proposed jury questions, instructions,
and definitions after the court's proposed charge is given to the parties or
their attorneys in order to preserve error.321 Moreover, a subsequent ob-
jection to the charge and oral request that the court submit the questions
and instructions requested by the party prior to trial may constitute an
impermissible intertwining of the party's objections and requests. 322
XII. JUDGMENT
The Texas Supreme Court took on the issue of prejudgment interest in
C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson323 and Ellis County State Bank v.
Keever.324 The court held in C & H Nationwide that the prejudgment
interest statute325 makes no distinction between past and future damages,
and therefore, a party is entitled to prejudgment interest on future dam-
ages. 32 6 Although the majority acknowledged that construing the term
"interest" to apply to future damages "sacrifice[s] a certain purity of
meaning," it nevertheless concluded that the Legislature had clearly in-
312. Id. at 158.
313. Id.
314. 880 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. 1993).
315. Id. at 755.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. 878 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ requested).
319. Id. at 245.
320. TEX. R. Civ. P. 273.
321. Alaniz, 878 S.W.2d at 245.
322. Id.
323. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1059 (June 22, 1994).
324. 888 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1994).
325. TEx. RaV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05, § 6(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
326. C & H Nationwide, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1066-67.
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tended such an imprecise usage.327 The court also rejected the defend-
ants' argument that construing section 6(a) 328 to permit interest on future
damages deprived them of due process and violated their right to trial by
jury.3 2 9 The court reasoned that the legislature had broad discretion in
fashioning the prejudgment interest component of an injured plaintiff's
remedy as part of its overall tort reform efforts.330
The supreme court refused to carry the logic of C & H Nationwide the
next step, however, when it held in Keever that prejudgment interest may
not be recovered on a punitive damages award.331 Although section
6(a) 332 states that prejudgment interest accrues "on the amount of the
judgment," 333 the court found a countervailing legislative mandate in sec-
tion 41.006 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.334 Section 41.006335
expressly prohibits prejudgment interest on punitive damages awards in
cases in which it applies. 336 Parsing the less than clear statutory language,
the court took a broad view of what types of cases were covered by sec-
tion 41.006337 and ultimately concluded that the statute was "intended to
preclude an award of prejudgment interest on punitive damages that
might otherwise be required by section 6(a).993 38
The supreme court addressed the formal requisites of a valid judgment
in Stewart v. USA Custom Paint & Body Shop, Inc. 339 The trial court in
Stewart had signed a captionless order dismissing a case for want of pros-
ecution, and several days later a computer printout listing a number of
cases, including the Stewart case, was generated.3 40 At some unknown
point, the two documents were stapled together and placed in the Stewart
case file. 341 The supreme court held that, while a properly executed order
of dismissal is a judgment, it must meet the formal requisites of a judg-
327. Id. at 1067.
328. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05, § 6(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
329. C & H Nationwide, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1068.
330. Id. at 1068-69.
331. Keever, 888 S.W.2d at 798; see also C & H Nationwide, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1067-
68 & n.7.
332. TEx REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05, § 6(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
333. Id.
334. TEx. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.006 (Vernon Supp. 1995); Keever, 888 S.W.2d
at 798.
335. TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE, § 41.006 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
336. Id.; see id. § 41.002(a) (identifying actions to which Chapter 41 applies).
337. Id. § 41.006. The court concluded that the listing of actions to which Chapter 41
applies in § 41.002(a) is not exclusive, since § 41.002(b) identifies certain actions to which
Chapter 41 does not apply. Id. § 41.002(a) and (b); Keever, 888 S.W.2d at 798.
338. 888 S.W.2d at 798. It is unclear whether the expansive phrasing of the court's
holding is intended to mean that prejudgment interest will not be permitted on punitive
damages awards even in cases identified in § 41.002(b) to which Chapter 41 does not apply.
See Crum & Forster, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., No. 06-92-00100-CV, 1994 W.L. 506209 at *47-
48 (Tex. App.-Texarkana, Sept. 19, 1994, writ requested) (concluding that Keever does
not apply to cases brought under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Pro-
tection Act and the Texas Insurance Code, and that prejudgment interest is part of the
damages to be trebled under those statutes).
339. 870 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1994).




ment.342 Specifically, the court stated that a judgment must be suffi-
ciently definite to define the rights of the parties such that ministerial
officials can execute on the judgment based only on the information con-
tained therein.343 The court concluded that the captionless order in the
case before it failed this test.3"
The Texas courts wrestled with questions regarding the preclusive ef-
fect to be given judgments during the Survey period. In the most signifi-
cant case, the supreme court refused to give non-mutual collateral
estoppel effect to a prior federal court judgment in Sysco Food Services,
Inc. v. Trapnell.345 The high court disagreed with the court of appeals'
determination that the plaintiffs in this products liability death action had
not had a full and fair opportunity in the prior federal action to litigate
the issue on which several defendants sought to invoke collateral estop-
pel.346 Nevertheless, given the unusual procedural posture, in which the
other defendants would not be bound by the federal court finding and
would, in fact, be trying to prove the contrary, the court concluded it
would not serve the goals of collateral estoppel nor be fair to the plaintiffs
to give that finding preclusive effect against them. 347 Although the court
characterized its holding as a narrow one, based on facts unlikely to re-
cur,348 the dissent viewed the majority opinion as an example of a hard
case making bad law.349
Default judgments were once again the subject of judicial scrutiny dur-
ing the Survey period. For example, the court in Strut Cam Dimensions,
Inc. v. Sutton,350 disagreed with a decision of one of its sister court of
appeals in holding that the presumption of finality that normally applies
to cases "regularly set for a conventional trial on the merits" 351 does not
apply to a post-answer default judgment based on the defendant's failure
to appear for trial.352
XIII. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
As discussed in Figari, 1994 Annual Survey, the Texas Supreme Court
previously held that a trial court has the authority to vacate an order
granting a new trial that it had previously entered.35 3 In a case decided
342. Id. at 20.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1130, 1135 (June 22, 1994).
346. Id. at 1134-35.
347. Id. at 1135-36.
348. Id. at 1136-37.
349. Id. at 1137 (Enoch, J., dissenting) ("[t]he Court's misapplication of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel is motivated by nothing more than the Court's desire to avoid what it
perceives is an unfair result").
350. No. 13-93-651-CV, 1994 WL 547855 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, Oct. 6, 1994, on
reh'g 1995 WL 55648 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, Feb. 9, 1995, n.w.h.).
351. North East Indep. School Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 897 (Tex. 1966).
352. Sutton, 1994 WL 547855 at *2. Cf Thomas v. Dubovy-Longo, 786 S.W.2d 506, 507
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
353. Fruehauf Corp. v. Carillo, 848 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993).
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during the Survey period, the court clarified that this authority exists only
so long as the trial court retains plenary power over the original judg-
ment.354 Any order vacating the new trial after that time is void.355
The supreme court addressed several other procedural issues regarding
motions for new trial during the Survey period as well. Director, State
Employees Workers' Compensation Division v. Evans3 56 presented the is-
sue of whether a party moving for a new trial after a default judgment
must introduce evidence at the hearing on its motion in order to satisfy
the test of Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc. ,357 or whether it may rely
on affidavits filed with the motion.358 The court held that the movant
may meet its burden with affidavits, and that these affidavits need not be
introduced into evidence at the hearing. 359 In Fredonia State Bank v.
General American Life Insurance Co. ,360 the court held that a motion for
new trial filed before the trial court enters an amended final judgment is
sufficient to preserve the movant's complaint regarding the factual insuf-
ficiency of the evidence when the substance of the motion is applicable to
the amended judgment as well.361 And in Jamar v. Patterson,362 the high
court held that a motion for new trial was conditionally filed when it was
tendered to the district clerk without payment of the proper fee, and the
date of that conditional filing was controlling for purposes of extending
the appellate timetable where the fee was subsequently paid. 363
The rules of procedure require the district clerk to immediately provide
the parties or their attorneys with written notice of the entry of a final
judgment.364 Rule 306a(4) 365 extends the thirty-day period for filing
post-judgment motions when a party proves, on sworn motion, that she
did not receive the required notice within twenty days, such that the pe-
riod begins on the date the party did receive notice - but in no event
more than ninety days after the original judgment was signed. 366 TWO
354. Porter v. Vick, 888 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. 1994).
355. Id.
356. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 779 (May 11, 1994).
357. 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939).
358. Evans, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 780.
359. Id.
360. 881 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1994).
361. Id. at 281-82. The court did not resolve the related question, on which the courts
of appeals have split, of whether a motion for new trial that is overruled by operation of
law operates to extend the appellate deadlines from the date of the amended judgment.
Id. at 282 n.2.
362. 868 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. 1993).
363. Id. at 319. Since Jamar was decided, two intermediate appellate courts have con-
cluded that the conditional filing of a new trial motion without the required fee is effective
to extend the appellate timetable even when the fee is not paid until a jurisdictional chal-
lenge is raised on appeal. Spellman v. Hoang, 887 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1994, n.w.h.); Ramirez v. Get "N" Go #103, 888 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1994, n.w.h.). If the fee is not paid while the trial court retains plenary
power, however, the trial court should refuse to consider the motion, and there may be a
basis to argue that the specific grounds raised in the motion are waived. Id.
364. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(3).




appellate courts came to opposite conclusions during the Survey period
regarding the consequences of a party's failure to verify its motion to
enlarge the time for filing post-judgment motions. In Vineyard Bay De-
velopment Co. v. Vineyard on Lake Travis367 the court allowed a party
that originally filed an unverified motion for enlargement of time to file a
verified motion more than thirty days after it received notice of the judg-
ment and still avail itself of the benefit of the extended timetable. 368 The
Dallas Court of Appeals rejected this approach, however, in Womack-
Humphreys Architects, Inc. v. Barrasso.369  Conceding that Rule
306a(5) 370 does not expressly place a time limit on the filing of a motion
for enlargement of time, the court nevertheless construed the rule in its
entirety as requiring a party to establish a prima facie case of the trial
court's extended jurisdiction through the filing of a sworn motion within
thirty days of the date notice of the judgment was first received.371
The court in City of McAllen v. Ramirez372 addressed a significant dis-
tinction between motions for new trial and motions to reinstate under
Rule 165a(3). 373 Although the rules governing the two motions are simi-
lar in many respects, the court held that, because a motion to reinstate
must be verified in order to extend the trial court's plenary jurisdiction, a
party could not circumvent that requirement by filing an unverified mo-
tion for new trial instead.374 The court rejected the argument that the
statement in Rule 165a that the dismissal and reinstatement procedures
are cumulative of any other procedures available to the parties375 permits
a party to follow the motion for new trial route.376 Instead, it concluded
that Rule 165a(3) 377 sets forth the exclusive remedy by way of a verified
motion to reinstate. 378
XIV. SEALING OF COURT RECORDS
The San Antonio Court of Appeals decided a pair of cases addressing
procedural and substantive issues under Rule 76a 379 during the Survey
period.3 80 Both cases involved the efforts of a news reporter to unseal
court records relating to the settlement of lawsuits arising out of sexual
367. 864 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
368. Id at 172.
369. 886 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ requested).
370. TEX. R. Ov. P. 306a(5).
371. Barrasso, 886 S.W.2d at 816. The court stated that its opinion should not be con-
strued as requiring the hearing on such a motion to be held within the thirty-day period.
Id
372. 875 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, orig. proceeding).
373. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a.
374. Ramirez, 875 S.W.2d at 704-05.
375. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a(4).
376. Ramirez, 875 S.W.2d at 705.
377. TEX R. Ov. P. 165a(3).
378. Ramirez, 825 S.W.2d at 704.
379. TEX. R. Ov. P. 76a.
380. See Fox v. Doe, 869 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ denied); Fox
v. Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ denied).
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assaults on minors.381 The court held that the public notices given of the
hearings on the requests for a sealing order were adequate, despite the
fact that they did not disclose the identities of the parties.382 Further, the
court held that the substantial privacy interest of the minor plaintiffs in
concealing their identities clearly outweighed the public interest in open
court records. 383 Thus, the court upheld the orders redacting the minors'
names from the agreed judgments entered in the two cases. 384
XV. DISQUALIFICATION AND RECUSAL OF JUDGES
Rule 18a,385 which governs the disqualification and recusal of judges
for cause, provides that a party may file a motion for disqualification or
recusal at least ten days before the date set for trial or other hearing.386
Before proceedings in the case may continue, the judge to whom the mo-
tion is directed must either excuse himself or refer the motion to the pre-
siding judge of the district for determination. 387 Courts have repeatedly
held that the mandatory "recuse or refer" provision of Rule 18a does not
come into play unless the motion to recuse is timely filed.388 In two cases
decided during the Survey period, therefore, trial courts overruled mo-
tions to recuse that were filed less than ten days in advance of the sched-
uled hearing. In each case, however, the court of appeals reversed.389
Jamilah v. Bass390 involved a trial court's order holding an attorney in
contempt. After the attorney failed to appear at a scheduled hearing in a
divorce action, the trial court ordered the attorney to appear six days
later and show cause why she should not be held in contempt for her
nonappearance. Upon receiving notice of the show cause hearing, the
attorney immediately filed a motion seeking to recuse the judge from the
case. The trial court denied this motion without hearing because it failed
to comply with the ten day requirement of Rule 18a.391 The judge then
proceeded with the scheduled contempt hearing and held the attorney in
contempt. Although the court of appeals acknowledged that a party who
fails to comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 18a waives her
381. Doe, 869 S.W.2d at 509; Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d at 501.
382. Doe, 869 S.W.2d at 510-11; Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d at 504.
383. Doe, 869 S.W.2d at 512; Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d at 507.
384. Doe, 869 S.W.2d at 512; Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d at 507. The court held that re-
daction was not the equivalent of sealing the judgments, which is prohibited by Tzx. R.
Civ. P. 76a(1). Doe, 869 S.W.2d at 510; Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d at 503.
385. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a.
386. Thx. R. Civ. P. 18a(a).
387. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(c).
388. See, e.g., Houston N. Properties v. White, 731 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1987, writ dism'd); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 659 S.W.2d 900, 901-02 (Tex.
App.-E! Paso 1983, no writ), discussed in Ernest E. Figari, Jr., Thomas A. Graves & A.
Erin Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 39 Sw. L. J. 419, 446
(1985).
389. Jamilah v. Boass, 862 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ);
Metzger v. Sebak, No. 01-92-00912-CV, 1994 WL 525523 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.],
Sept. 29, 1994, writ requested).
390. 862 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
391. Id. at 202 n.2.
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right to complain of a judge's failure to recuse himself,3 92 it nevertheless
held that the trial court should have recused himself or referred the mo-
tion to the presiding judge under the circumstances. 393 Because the attor-
ney filed her motion to recuse the day after she received notice of the
contempt hearing, and less than ten days existed between that date and
the date of the hearing, the court concluded that the trial judge had vio-
lated his plain duty by deciding the motion himself, which is not an option
available under the rule.394
Faced with similar facts, the court in Metzger v. Sebek395 decided iden-
tically. According to the court, the ten-day requirement of Rule 18a can-
not apply if the movant receives less than ten days notice of the hearing
from which he seeks to recuse the judge.396 Any contrary holding would
not be reasonable, said the court, because litigants cannot be required to
comply with a rule when compliance is impossible. 397 The Metzger court
also held that none of the following facts constituted a sufficient basis for
disqualification or recusal of the trial judge: (1) the judge had once
clerked for a participating attorney for the defense, and the judge's son
had clerked for another of the defense firms; (2) a defense firm once had
invited the judge to a firm outing; (3) the judge had dined previously at a
restaurant owned by one of the defense attorneys; and (4) the judge had
received campaign contributions from some of the defense firms. 398 The
court observed that Rule 18b 399 covers none of these situations, and not
one of the alleged grounds of recusal provided good reason to question
the trial judge's impartiality. 40°
XVI. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
Satellite skirmishes in civil litigation continue to occur over the disqual-
ification of counsel. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Syntek Finance
Corp.,401 a recent decision of the Texas Supreme Court, dealt with the
"substantial relationship" test for attorney disqualification based on prior
representation of the same or a related client. Rule 1.09 of the Texas
392. Id. at 202-03 (citing Watkins v. Pearson, 795 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1990, writ denied)).
393. Jamilah, 862 S.W.2d at 203.
394. Id.
395. No. 01-92-00912-CV, 1994 WL 525523 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.], Sept. 29,
1994, writ requested).
396. Id at *26.
397. Id Although some of the motions from which the plaintiff sought to recuse thejudge had been on file for more than ten days before the hearing, this fact did not influence
the court's decision. Instead, the court concluded that the plaintiff could treat the motions
as potential nullities, and need not move to recuse the judge, until the motions were set for
hearing. Ila
398. Id at *27.
399. TEx. R. Civ. P. 18b(2) lists those instances in which a judge should recuse himself.
400. Metzger, 1994 WL 525523 at *27.
401. 881 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. 1994).
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Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct4°2 provides that a lawyer shall
not take a representation that is adverse to a former client if the new
matter is the same or a substantially related matter. Reiterating the rule
it first announced in NCNB Texas National Bank v. Coker,403 the court in
Syntek stated that a movant seeking disqualification under the substantial
relationship test must prove that the facts of the two representations "are
so related that a genuine threat exists that confidences revealed to former
counsel will be divulged to a present adversary."404 The movant appar-
ently attempted to meet this burden by pointing to information used by
opposing counsel in the suit that allegedly was disclosed to that counsel in
confidence during a prior representation. After reviewing evidence that
suggested otherwise, 40 5 the court held the trial court had not abused its
discretion in denying the motion to disqualify based on a determination
that "no substantial relationship existed between the current and former
representations. ,406
In two cases decided on the same day, the supreme court addressed the
standards governing a disqualification motion predicated on the hiring of
a nonlawyer employee. Phoenix Founders, Inc. v. Marshall407 involved
the attempted disqualification of a law firm that rehired a paralegal who
had worked for opposing counsel for only three weeks. Again relying on
Coker,40 8 the court conclusively presumed that confidential information
about the case was imparted to the paralegal during her three-week em-
ployment because she actually worked on the case during her employ-
ment.409 The court would not conclusively presume, however, that the
paralegal shared this confidential information with the other members of
her new firm.410 Instead, the court recognized only a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a nonlawyer who switches sides in ongoing litigation will
share confidential information acquired at the first firm with members of
the new firm.411 Specifically, the court held that the challenged firm may
rebut the presumption "by showing that sufficient precautions have been
taken to guard against any disclosure of confidences. '41 2 Although the
court acknowledged that disqualification would always be required in
402. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCr 1.09(a)(3) (1989), reprinted in TEX. GOV'T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. (Vernon Supp. 1994) (STATE BAR RuLEs art. X, § 9).
403. 765 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. 1989).
404. Syntek, 881 S.W.2d at 320-21.
405. The court observed that there was testimony indicating that the information at
issue was available in the public domain and disclosed to opposing counsel by movant
during discovery in the current litigation. Id at 321.
406. Id.
407. 887 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. 1994).
408. See Coker, 765 S.W.2d at 400.
409. Phoenix Founders, 887 S.W.2d at 834.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 835. In particular, "the newly-hired paralegal should be cautioned not to
disclose any information relating to the representation of a client of the former employer
... she should be instructed not to work on any matter on which [she] worked during [her]
prior employment... and the firm should take other reasonable steps to ensure that [she]
does not work on any matters on which [she] worked for her prior employer." Id.
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some circumstances absent the consent of the former employer's client,413
ordinarily disqualification would not be required as long as " 'the practi-
cal effect of formal screening has been achieved.' "414
The court in Phoenix Founders appeared to draw comfort from the
consistency between its view and the decisions of various bar committees
on ethics and courts in other jurisdictions.415 The court believed these
decisions were founded on a recognition that paralegals and other
nonlawyers should form a mobile workforce. 416 The court thereby
seemed to distinguish the situation presented in Petroleum Wholesale,
Inc. v. Marshall,417 in which the Dallas Court of Appeals articulated a
conclusive presumption that an attorney who has obtained confidential
information shares it with other members of her firm. 418 Nevertheless,
the decision in Phoenix Founders raises serious questions about the con-
tinued validity of the decision in Petroleum Wholesale.419
Grant v. Thirteenth Court of Appeals420 furnished the court with an
immediate opportunity to practice the rules it announced in Phoenix
Founders. Although the court of appeals in Grant employed the rebutta-
ble presumption rule in deciding the case, the supreme court concluded
that the intermediate court erred when it held that the presumption had
been rebutted simply by evidence that no confidences were actually re-
vealed by the nonlawyer employee. 42' According to the court, the test
for disqualification is met by demonstrating a genuine threat of disclo-
sure, not an actual event of disclosure. 422 The court remarked that any
rule focusing on actual disclosure would place an unscalable hurdle
before the party seeking disqualification, inasmuch as the only persons
who know whether confidences were actually shared will typically be the
same persons opposing the disqualification. 423 After considering evi-
dence which revealed that the new firm had failed to institute appropriate
safeguards like those described in Phoenix Founders, the court held that
the trial judge had acted properly in granting the motion to disqualify.4 24
413. For example, when information relating to the representation of the adverse client
has in fact been disclosed, or when screening would be ineffective or the nonlawyer neces-
sarily would be required to work on the other side of a matter that is the same as or
substantially related to a matter on which the nonlawyer has previously worked. Id.
414. Id. (quoting In re Complex Asbestos Litigation, 232 Cal. App. 3d 572, 283 Cal.
Rptr. 732, 746-47 (1991)).
415. Id.; see also TEX. COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Op. 472, 55 TEX. B. J. 520(1992); ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Informal Op. 1526
(1988).
416. Phoenix Founders, 887 S.W.2d at 835.
417. 751 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, orig. proceeding).
418. Phoenix Founders, 887 S.W.2d at 834.
419. The court expressly declined the opportunity to decide whether Petroleum Whole-
sale was correctly decided, however, or whether it remained viable under the new discipli-
nary rules which, unlike Canon 9 of the former Texas Code of Professional Responsibility,
no longer prohibit the mere appearance of impropriety. Id. at 835 & n.1.
420. 888 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).
421. Id at 462.
422. Id
423. Id.
424. Id. at 468.
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Except in limited circumstances, Rule 3.08(a) of the Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits an attorney from acting as both a
lawyer and a witness in the same case.4 25 Although the supreme court
addressed this ethical rule just last term in Mauze v. Curry,426 courts con-
tinue to struggle with its application. In Koch Oil Co. v. Anderson Pro-
ducing, Inc.,427 for example, the court held consonant with Mauze that an
attorney had violated Rule 3.08(a) by testifying as both a fact and expert
witness in the case, and that the trial court had abused its discretion in
failing to disqualify the attorney on the motion of the opposing party.4 28
In contrast, the court in May v. Crofts429 refused to mandate that an at-
torney be disqualified in a probate proceeding in which the opposing
party planned to call the attorney as a material fact witness. Although
the majority in May seemed concerned about the possibility that oppos-
ing counsel was attempting to use Rule 3.08(a) as a tactical weapon by
calling the attorney as a witness,430 the dissenting opinion suggests that
the need for the attorney's testimony was legitimate. 431
The careful practitioner faced with the decision of whether to seek dis-
qualification of his opponent should take note of Vaughan v. Walther.432
There the supreme court held that a party had waived his complaint by
failing to file his motion to disqualify until six and one-half months after
discovering the basis for disqualification.433
XVII. MISCELLANEOUS
A. SANcrIONS
Unfortunately, the topic of sanctions continues to receive an unde-
served level of attention from the Texas appellate courts. Many of the
decisions involve Rule 13, which provides that the signature of an attor-
ney (or a party) on a court filing constitutes a certificate that he has read
the filing and it "is not groundless and brought in bad faith, or groundless
and brought for the purpose of harassment. ' '43 Monroe v. Grider,435 a
recent decision of the Dallas Court of Appeals, considered the "bad
faith" requirement of the rule. First, the court rejected appellant's argu-
ment that the definition of "bad faith" under the Texas Deceptive Trade
425. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CoNDuCT 3.08(a) (1989), reprinted in TEX. GOV'T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. (Vernon Supp. 1994) (STATE BAR RULES art. X, § 9).
426. 861 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. 1993), discussed in Figari, 1994 Annual Survey, supra note 53,
at 1716.
427. 883 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, writ requested).
428. Id. at 789.
429. 868 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, orig. proceeding).
430. Id. at 399.
431. Id at 400 (Grant, J., dissenting).
432. 875 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1994).
433. Id at 691.
434. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.
435. 884 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied).
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Practices Act 436 should apply to Rule 13. 437 Instead, the court concluded
that public policy supports a lesser standard for bad faith under Rule 13
than under the DTPA.438 Second, the court held that a party acts in bad
faith for Rule 13 purposes when discovery puts him on notice that his
understanding of the facts may be incorrect and he does not thereafter
make a reasonable inquiry into the facts supporting a pleading.439 A
party cannot avoid Rule 13 sanctions, said the court, by claiming he was
unaware of the facts making his claim groundless, unless he has made the
reasonable inquiry mandated by Rule 13.440
A trial court may not impose sanctions under Rule 13 except for good
cause, and any sanctions order that is entered must include specific find-
ings supporting the court's action." 1 Earlier cases considering the issue
have held that a party waives any complaint it might have about the lack
of specificity in the sanctions order by failing to timely object to the form
of the order in the trial court."42 The court in Campos v. Ysleta General
Hospital, Inc.443 agreed, but suggested that even a half-hearted attempt to
call the trial court's attention to the need for particularized findings may
be sufficient to avoid waiver." More importantly, the court held that
the remedy for a trial court's failure to make the required level of find-
ings is to abate the appeal and remand the case for a short period of time
during which the trial court can make particularized findings. 445
Two cases decided during the Survey period involved sanctions that
were imposed in connection with court-ordered mediations. In Island
Entertainment, Inc. v. Castaneda, 6 the court reversed an order levying
sanctions as a result of a party's failure to perform a settlement agree-
ment signed during mediation. "Breach of contract has never been a
ground for judicial sanctions," remarked the court, and breach of a settle-
ment contract after mediation is indistinguishable from a breach of con-
tract without mediation.447 Hansen v. Sullivan4" accords with an earlier
436. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.01-17.46 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1995).
437. Monroe, 884 S.W. 2d at 818.
438. Id. The court observed that the policy behind Rule 13, which is intended to dis-
courage frivolous pleadings, differed from the policy underlying the DTPA, which "pre-
vents courts from easily imposing sanctions that would discourage consumers from suing
for deceptive trade practices." Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 819; cf. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874 (5th Cir.
1988).
441. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.
442. See, e.g., Booth v. Malkan, 858 S.W.2d 641,644 (Tex. App. -Fort Worth 1993, writ
denied), discussed in Figari, 1994 Annual Survey, supra note 53, at 1685; Bloom v. Graham,
825 S.W.2d 244, 247 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).
443. 879 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
444. Id. at 70.
445. Id. at 71.
446. 882 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
447. Id. at 5.
448. 886 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.).
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decision by the same court" 9 holding that a mediation order requiring
"good faith negotiations" is void.450 The Hansen court therefore over-
turned a trial court's order sanctioning a party for failing to negotiate in
good faith at the mediation.451
TWo additional cases involving sanctions are worthy of note. First, the
court in Masterson v. CoX452 held that a trial judge abused his discretion
by entering a default judgment against a litigant for her failure to attend a
Rule 166453 pretrial hearing. Unlike Koslow's v. Mackie,4 54 in which the
supreme court upheld a "death penalty" sanction levied under similar cir-
cumstances, the aggrieved party in Masterson had no notice the pretrial
conference was to be a disposition hearing.455 Finally, in what appears to
be a case of first impression, the Amarillo court of appeals held in Beas-
ley v. Peters456 that an attorney-party appearing in a case pro se could not
recover attorney's fees as a sanction under Rule 13 because the attorney
represented herself and, therefore, did not "incur" any fees. 457
B. SETrLEMENT AGREEMENTS
Rule 11458 provides that no agreement between attorneys or parties in
connection with a pending suit will be enforced unless it is made in open
court on the record or it is made in writing and filed with the court. As
pointed out by the court in Padilla v. LaFrance,459 there has been "con-
siderable confusion, and an abundance of dicta, concerning whether Rule
11 means what it says.''46° Perhaps most troubling about Rule 11, and the
issue under consideration in Padilla, is whether it extends to written set-
tlement agreements. The majority in Padilla, relying on the supreme
court's ruling in Kennedy v. Hyde, 6' held that settlement agreements are
subject to rejection or repudiation, irrespective of whether they are in
writing and fully-executed, unless and until they are filed with the
court.462 The dissenting judge took a different view, suggesting that a
party to a series of writings that arguably constitutes a contract should
not be permitted to arbitrarily repudiate his agreement simply because it
refers to a pending lawsuit. 63 The dissent echoes the lament of every
449. Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247, 250-51 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992,
orig. proceeding) (court cannot force litigants to negotiate during mediation, but only to
attend).
450. Hansen, 886 S.W.2d at 469.
451. Id.
452. 886 S.W.2d 436, 439 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.).
453. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166.
454. 796 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. 1990).
455. Masterson, 886 S.W.2d at 439.
456. 870 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, no writ).
457. Id. at 196.
458. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
459. 875 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ granted).
460. Id. at 733.
461. 682 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. 1984).
462. Padilla, 875 S.W.2d at 734.
463. Id. at 735 (Murphy, J. dissenting).
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practitioner faced with the dilemma of trying to ensure the validity of a
signed settlement agreement while also attempting to prevent the publi-
cation of settlement terms that necessarily results from the filing of the
settlement document itself. No similar concerns were voiced by the Dal-
las Court of Appeals in Stevens v. Snyder.464 There the court held that a
party who accepts a settlement agreement cannot later arbitrarily with-
draw from that agreement.465 Although it appears the party attempting
to withdraw from the settlement in Stevens did so before the agreement
was filed of record, the court of appeals affirmed a judgment based on the
settlement terms.466 In doing so, the court cited Rule 11 as authorizing
the enforcement of settlement agreements, but made no mention of the
rule's filing requirement.467 The supreme court has granted the applica-
tion for writ of error in Padilla and hopefully will resolve the reigning
uncertainty exemplified by the court of appeals' opinions in Padilla and
Stevens.
464. 874 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied).
465. Id. at 243.
466. Id. at 244.
467. Id. at 243. The court also relied on TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 154.071(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995) because- the settlement agreement was signed during a
mediation. Rule 11, however, does not appear to differentiate between settlement agree-
ments signed in or out of mediation.
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